Swarthmore College

Works
Philosophy Faculty Works

Philosophy

2006

Literature As Material Figuration: Benjamin, Sebald, And Human
Life In Time
Richard Thomas Eldridge
Swarthmore College, reldrid1@swarthmore.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
Richard Thomas Eldridge. (2006). "Literature As Material Figuration: Benjamin, Sebald, And Human Life In
Time". Acta Philosophica Fennica 79: Visions Of Value And Truth: Understanding Philosophy And
Literature. Volume 79, 13-29.
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/103

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.

RICHARD ELDRIDGE

Literature as Material Figuration
Benjamin, Sebald, and Human Life in Time

1.
The term “literature” is at least something of a family resemblance term, and it
has a fairly wide range of reasonable apphcations. One can talk of the hterature
on X — ladybugs, or chess, or cello varnishes, as may be — and mean only all or
much of what has been written about a particular subject. In German language
scholarship, one often begins an essay with a Uteraturver^ichnis, a review of the
most important prior work on a topic, whatever the topic might be. These uses,
however, are surely not what the Nobel or Booker Prize committees have in
mind in awarding prizes for hterature, nor are they what is suggested by the
commendatory adjective “hterary” as in “a hterary person” or “of hterary merit.”
Yet even where what is in view under the heading of the hterary is some sort
of value, there are nonetheless many different valuable experiences that
hterature affords. These valuable experiences include, among others, entertain
ment, consolation, the pleasures of archaic regression (reminiscent of being read
to as a child), the acquisition of historical knowledge, the sharpening of personal
or pohdcal hope, and absorption in and admiration of verbal virtuosity. It
would, I think, be a mistake either to overlook or to underrate the considerable
variety of values that hterary works can and do subserve.
I am, however, nonetheless going to venture an extended account of at least
one value that hterature - and especiahy fictional narrative hterature, from epic
to lyric to drama to the novel — centrally furthers through the cultivation of a
distinctive and valuable condition or abihty of human persons. This condition
or abihty — to give it a somewhat awkward name — is reflective depth achieved via
recognition.
The suggestion that the reading and writing of hterature cultivate reflective
depth will help us, I think, to find a way between the ScyUa of didacticism and
the Charybdis of formahsm. Surely hterature must ‘say something’ about hfe,
but surely, too, the way in which what is said matters, and hterature produces
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less ‘moral news’ than didacticism supposes. The suggestion, then, is that
literature is a sort of formally significant attention to life, where what shows in
literary forms of attention and arrangement of materials is a continuing
aspiration for expressive freedom and fulfillment, typically both shaped and
frustrated, in part, in specific ways. We see ourselves as pursuers of expressive
freedom in situ, under difficult conditions, in the protagonists and authorial
personae whom we encounter (or create). By thus recognizing ourselves, we can
become somewhat more reflectively deep about the contours of human life in
time.
This suggestion immediately raises questions, however. First, what is the
subject matter, object, or target of reflective depth? Something, I have sug
gested, hke human life in time. But what is that? And what is it for a literary
work, especially a fictional narrative work, to embody a deep view about human
life and to bring its readers to share in it? As an aside, 1 remark that the answer
to this question is not obvious for philosophy either. Does philosophy achieve
reflective depth simply by arriving at big answers to big questions through more
or less deductive argument? That seems at least not to be the whole story for
philosophy as a form of human practice and texmal or conversational art.
Second, why and how does reflective depth as a condition of the person
matter to us? Why and how is it a good thing for persons to be deep or to
cultivate the ability to reflect deeply about life?
Third, how is reflective depth achieved within essentially literary, narrative
fictional pieces of writing? In virtue of what formal, thematic and expressive
feamres — features that to some extent distinguish texts of literary art from other
pieces of writing — is reflective depth embodied in a work for our participation
in it?
I will have more to say about both what reflective depth is and why it is a
value for us. But I want to begin by considering first this third question or set
of questions: how is reflective depth embodied in a work of literary art?
In my recent book on the philosophy of art, I claim that “works of art
piterary and otherwise] present a subject matter as a focus for thought and
emotional attitude, distinctively fused to the imaginative exploration of
material”.' This definition of art — if that is the right word — specifies criteria in
Wittgenstein’s sense for the use of the word “art”. It undertakes “to elucidate
and organize our linguistic and conceptual practice, in a situation in which we
are confused by the varieties of artistic practice, by the varieties of things people
say about them, and by the powerful but obscure character of our own
responses”," and yet where, still, something can be said about what we do.
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In relation to literature, what this means is that literature as an art, when it
is successful, has representational-thematic, expressive-attitudinal, and formalmaterial dimensions, aU in interaction with one another. This thought is in the
spirit of Aristotle’s claim in the Poetics that a successful tragic drama will be a
presentation (mimesis) of an action with all of plot, character, thought, melody,
diction, and spectacle. According to Aristotle, each of these parts of a successful
tragic drama must be properly coordinated with the others. Too much spectacle
and too little plot, for example, will yield in one way the episodic and in another
way what are perhaps the excesses of Euripedean drama. Too much plot and
too httle thought will yield a dramatic stmcture that lacks general thematic
significance or that will fail to satisfy the requirement of presenting the universal
in the particular. Too little melody, diction, and spectacle — that is, too little
concern for the embodiment of the presentation in just a certain set of words
and stagings, both crafted and felt - will likewise fail in presentational power or
illumination, presenting instead only what is already known and distinctively
clarifying nothing.
More abstractly, content and form both matter, and they matter in their
specific ways of relating to one another. As Wolfgang Huemer has recently
remarked, “If we try to define what is particular about literary texts, we find that
they put an emphasis not on ivhat is said, but on how it is said; hterary language
makes itself manifest. — At least to some extent in hterary texts language itself
becomes the topic”.^ An emphasis on bow what is said is said is especially
prominent in the so-called L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets, such as Charles
Bernstein and Clark Coohdge, with their radicahzation of both the voice of lyric
poetry and the symbohstic-imagism of Objectivism. Yet even they, while
foregrounding the sheer look, sound, and feel of words and assonances,
produce texts that admit of some paraphrasabihty and readabihty. One can —
just barely — say what they are about. Hence one should say instead that hterary
texts put emphasis not only on what is said (represented and expressed), but also
on how it is said.
Such emphases are also often in play in so-called ordinary speech and
writing, in contexts from journahsm to conversation to criticism to history. But
this just shows that, as Huemer goes on to remark, “Literature — is not a niche
phenomenon; it must not be viewed as an unnecessary but entertaining
ornament, but rather as a practice central to our language without which we
might not even be able to master a language as complex as ours in the first
place”.^ The special intensities that hterature achieves are not sideways to hfe,
with their own special domains of objects known such as possible worlds or
fictional objects; they are rather part of specially apt attention — all at once
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representational-thematic, emotional-attitudinal, and craftlike-sensuous — to
ordinary hfe. These intensities are achieved through the controlled and aptly
original use of devices that structure perception, thought, and feeling, including
emplotment, metaphor, allegory, irony, hyperbole, understatement, and
assonance, among many, many others.
Through the apt use of such literary devices, fuUness of attention (ideational,
emotional, and sensuous) is achieved rather than shirked. Cliche, or unthinking
repetition of what is merely rote and stock, is the enemy of literary art. The
satisfaction that is sought in Uterary art involves what Spinoza called the
transformation of an inadequate idea of an affection into a more adequate idea.^
Through literary art one gains a better understanding of what is worth feehng
and caring about in what ways, where this better understanding is grounded in
what one does in fact feel and care about, when one pays the fullest possible
attention to the objects and quahty of one’s experience. In this one moves into
a structure of care, reflection, and investment in activity that is more stable and
appropriate to the objects and events of human hfe.
I am interested, then, in what Wilham Rothman and Marian Keane have
called “the astonishing capacities for meamngfulness that [works of art] have
discovered within the singular conditions of their medi[a]”.^ These capacities of
meaningfulness involve, I have suggested, in hterature the achievement of full
ness of attention to phenomena of hfe through the use of hterary devices.
Through such fuUness of attention, a stmcture of care, reflection, and invest
ment in activity is achieved, so that we lead more freely and fuUy the hves of
persons or selves who take an interest in their worlds, rather than being buffeted
about by experience received only passively and inchoately. Apart from the
kinds of noticings, expressings, and respondings that art and hterature can
embody, our hves can become pale, conventionahzed, anonymous, or, one
might say, not deep.
A significant coroUary of this view about hterature, attention, and fuher
personhood is that writing and reading are understood as neighboring modes
of activity, both of which involve the cultivation of attention. What we do when
we read weU is foUow and identify with achievements of fuher attention, as they
are managed in situ by both writers, on the one hand, and protagonists in hterary
works, on the other.^ What I am suggesting is that the hfe of persons inherently
involves the pursuit of a fuher and more stable stmcture of care, reflection, and
investment in activity (despite or across tragic inhibitions) in densely textured
ways in specific cultural settings.
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2.
It is not easy to characterize the nature of the fuUness of attention that some
writers achieve and in which we can participate by reading. One way, however,
to begin a characterization is to note its differences from both theorizing or
discursive-classificatory thinking that makes use of pre-existent categories, on
the one hand, and more or less instantaneous intuition or perception, on the
other. This, in fact, is exactly how Walter Benjamin, is his masterpiece essay
“The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism”,* both explains and
extends Friedrich Schlegel’s conception of the achievement of literature as an
art. Schlegel, Benjamin writes, found it “necessary---- to seek a mediation
between discursive thinking and intellectual inmition, since the one did not
satisfy his imperative of intuitive comprehension, whereas the other faded to
satisfy his systematic interests. He thus found himself---- faced with the
problem of combining the maximum systematic range of thought with the most
extreme truncation of discursive thinking.---- He searches for a noneidetic
intuition of the system, and he finds this in language” (139-140).
The system in question here is the system of achieved freedom or of a more
fully human way of Hfe, involving full and stable care, reflection, and investment
in activity. To say that intellectual intuition fads to satisfy an interest in this
system is to say that such a way of life is not simply there to be grasped in either
an instantaneous inteUectual intuition of the whole or in a moment of blinding
perception of the actual. But more temporady extended discursive-theoretic
characterization of such a way of life remains, for Schlegel, abstract, or
something whose avadabdity and worth we are unable to feel directly. So one
needs not a theory of freedom, the right or the good, but a more intuitive yet
also temporady extended comprehension, achieved in relation to feeling, of
what is possible and valuable for us.
Schlegel, then, described a certain use of language as a vehicle of attention
in the successful dterary work. The task of criticism is to fodow and participate
in the deployment of attention within the work. In so conceiving of criticism,
Benjamin argues,
Schlegel’s concept of criticism achieve [d] freedom from heteronomous aesthetic
doctrines, [and] it made this freedom possible in the first place by setting up for
artworks a criterion other than the rule — namely, the criterion of an immanent
structure specific to the work itself He did this not with the general concepts of
harmony and organization which, in the case of Herder or Moritz, were incapable
of establishing a criticism of art, but with a genuine theory of art — as a medium
of reflection and of the work as a center of reflection (155).
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There are, that is to say, no a priori knowable forms, use of which is either
necessary or sufficient for success in art. Nor is there any definite content that
is required. As Benjamin remarks, “the concept of measure is remote from
Romanticism, which paid no heed to an a priori of content, something to be
measured in art” (184). Instead “the value of a work depends solely on whether
it makes its immanent critique possible or not” (159), that is, on whether it
supports critical or readerly participation in its deployments of attention.
Benjamin himself argues that this conception of the value of a work of art
remains dominant for us today, even where it is contested by either staler
classicisms, on the one hand, or by the vulgarizations of commodity valuation
and psycho-biographic cults of personality, on the other. Citing Flaubert and the
Stefan George circle, Benjamin claims that “the doctrine that art and its works
are essentially neither appearances of beauty nor manifestations of immediately
inspired emotions, but media of forms, resting in themselves, has not fallen into
oblivion since the Romantics, at least not in the spirit of artistic development
itself’ (177), where the forms in question are not those of classical rules or
unities, but forms of fuller attention.
Form, then, does the work of reflection or of attention that blends thought
with feeling.
Form is the objective expression of the reflection proper to the work, the reflection
that constitutes its essence. Form is the possibility of reflection in the work. It
grounds the work a priori, therefore, as a principle of existence; it is through its
form that the work of art is a living center of reflection. In the medium of reflection
in art, new centers of reflection are continually forming---- . The infinimde of art

attains to reflection first of all only in such a center, as in a limiting value; that is, it
attains to self-comprehension and therewith to comprehension generally. This limitvalue is the form of presentation [Darstellungsiveisef of the individual work. On it
rests the possibility of a relative unity and closure of the work in the medium of art,
[even though] the work remains burdened with a moment of contingency (156).
The relative unity and closure that Benjamin has in mind differ from the
putatively absolute closure of a demonstrative argument, on the one hand, and
the lack of closure that characterizes the merely incidental or episodic, on the
other. Instead, the author’s attention and interest are excited by an initiating
scene or incident. In and through the act of writing, the writer imagines what
might further happen, or what thoughts and feelings are in play in relation to the
initiator, as well as how, exactly, to work out in words the presentation of
initiator, consequents, and attendant thoughts and feelings. A material form of
presentation is here achieved in relation to the initiator, as an immanent
stmcture, rather than as form imposed from without. A center of reflection is
formed in the work in relation to the initiator. The relative closure and unity of
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the work are achieved when attention calms itself in a feeling of completeness,
signaled in a sense that “yes, it was all so”. (Compare Herbert Marcuse’s
discussion of aesthetic unity, understood as culminating in the sense that “Fs
war dock so schdn”'''^ — it was all so beautiful anyway; it made sense; the work has
clarified the initiating scene, even in the absence of complete system of
freedom, theory of value, or demonstrated moral.)
Certain claims about the proper way of reading a literary work follow
immediately from the conception of it as a material form of presentation of
energies of attention, focused on an initiator and its consequents, in relation to
further thoughts and feelings. As Schlegel himself observed in his critique of
Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, “it is fine and necessary to abandon oneself utterly to
the impression a poetic work makes----and perhaps only in particular cases to
confirm one’s feeling through reflection and to raise it to the level of'thought
----and complete it. But it is no less necessary to be able to abstract from all
that is particular, so that----hovering---- one grasps the universal” (as cited in
Benjamin, 153"). In reading, a certain abandonment to the literary text----to
its energies, forms, and movements of attention---- will be necessary, as one
follows reflection in the process of forming itself But it will also be necessary
sometimes, intermittendy, to stand back in one’s own reflections, so as to
balance the movement of thought one has followed against life itself, as one
reflects on it, and against other courses of embodied reflection. Within these
two movements of reading, and with the work and its writer one can then,
sometimes, come to say and feel, “yes, it was all so”.

3.
It is time for me to try to indicate more concretely this mode of conclusion and
its manner of achievement through literary form by turning to a particular case,
W. G. Sebald’s long story “Paul Bereyter”, the second of his four long stories
published together as The Emigrants^ Like the other stories in this collection,
“Paul Bereyter” focuses on its single titular character, in this case as that
character is considered by a first-person narrator who had once been Paul’s
student in grammar school. It is a kind of muted elegy or meditation, as it opens
with the lines
In January 1984, the news reached me from S that on the evening of the 30'*’ of
December, a week after his seventy-fourth birthday, Paul Bereyter, who had been
my teacher at primary school, had put an end to his life. A short distance from S,
where the railway track curves out of a willow copse into the open fields, he had lain
himself down in front of a train (27/41).
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This first sentence akeady embodies Sebald’s striking personal style, some
what more natural in German than in English. It begins with a prepositional
phrase, the main verb is in the passive voice, two time indications delay the
appearance of the noun subject “Paul Bereyter” of the main dependent clause
that gives the news, and again a reladve clause stands between that subject noun
phrase and its verb phrase. The second sentence continues the intermpting
focus on details, as two place indications, the second in explicatory apposition
to the first, and offering the perceptible details of the curving track and the
willow copse, precede an independent clause in the past perfect. In the German,
in fact, these two sentences are one long sentence, with the dramatic “sich---vor den Zug legte” coming only at the very end. In addition, the clauses in
German are connected by explicatory conjunctions that the English omits: “thus
a week after his 74* birthday”; “also eine Woche nach seinem 74. Geburtstag”;
and “in that he had...”; “indem er sich”. The railway line leads itself out in a
curve (“in einem Bogen----herausfuhrt”) and then attains the open field “das
offene Feld gewinnt”, almost as though it, too, were a character. These two
sentences are accompanied by a somewhat blurry black-and-white photograph,
showing in the foreground, where it occupies about half of the picture plane at
its front edge, a single rad, with to the far right edge a dark companion rad
curving along with it toward the right, away from trees on the left and toward
a field. It is ad, akeady, almost unbearably evocative and melancholy. The effect
of the style and the photograph is one of delay in detads that, we may presume,
have some significance in holding the narrator’s attention, though this
significance is not spelled out: rather, these detads are to accumulate — both in
the narrator’s consciousness and in the consciousness of we who foUow his
consciousness - untd they form a pattern whose significance can almost, but not
quite, be explicated in a moral or secret key to the story. Instead of a moral or
secret key, what the narrator gets, and what we get, is a more nearly
unverbalizable sense of the pattern and of the pathos, and the beauty and
fragdity amidst the pathos, that this life (Paul Bereyter’s life) and human life
(both the narrator’s life and our lives) all embody.
FoUowing this opening sentence, the narrative plays out in this style through
roughly nine further scenes, as the narrator attempts to come to terms with Paul
Bereyter’s life, more or less as fodows.
1) The narrator notes that the obituary in the local newspaper from S fads
to mention “that Paul Bereyter had died of his own freewid” (aus freien
Stiicken) (27/42) and that, besides describing his dedication to his pupds, his
inventiveness as a teacher, and his love of music, it “added, with no further
explanation (“In einer weiter nicht erlauterten Bemerkung”), that during the

Literature as Material Figuration 21
Third Reich Paul Bereyter had been prevented from practicing his chosen
profession” {21IA2). As a result of the manner of death and of “this curiously
unconnected, inconsequential statement” (“Diese ganzUch unverbundene und
unverbindliche Feststellung”) (27/42), the narrator concerns himself more and
more with Paul Bereyter (“mich---- immer haufiger mit Paul Bereyter beschaftige”), resolving to “get beyond” his own fond memories of him in order
to find out more about his secret history.
2) The narrator remrns to S, where he has been only occasionally since
leaving school, in order to visit Paul’s apartment and to talk with the villagers.
He remembers how the smdents, like everyone else in the village, had spoken
of their teacher simply as “Paul” (28/43), and he imagines Paul lying on his
balcony, skating in winter, and stretched out on the track (29/44). Or, rather “1
saw him----”. “Ich sah ihn liegen auf dem geschindelten Altan, seiner sommerlichen Schlafstatt, das Gesicht iiberwolbt von den Heerziigen der Gestirne” —
on the airy balcony, his face vaulted over by the host of stars” (29/44). These
investigations and imaginings, however, do not bring him any closer to Paul,
except in a few “emotional moments that seemed presumptuous to me”; “in
gewissen Ausuferungen des Gefiihls [overflowings of feelings], wie sie mir
unzulassig [inadmissible, forbidden] erscheinen” (29/45). As a result, he has
now written down “what I know of Paul Bereyter” (“zu deren Vermeidung ich
jetzt aufgeschrieben habe, was ich von Paul Bereyter weiB und im Verlauf
meiner Erkundigen fiber ihn in Erfahrung bringen konnte”) (29/45).
3) The narrator describes his family’s move from W to S, “19 kilometers
away” (32/45), and his joining Paul Bereyter’s third class. He recalls his
friendship with Fritz Binswanger, a slow boy who exactly shared the narrator’s
“incorrigibly sloppy handwriting” (“unverbesserhch schweinisch Handschrift”)
(31/47). They study cockchafer beetles together and share lunches. Once they
each received a present of “a white butterpear” (32/49). Fritz later became a
chef of “international renown” (32/49). The narrator and Fritz later met in
London, in 1984, “in the reading room of the British Museum, where I was
researching the history of Bering’s Alaska expedition and Fritz was studying
eighteenth-century French cookbooks” (32/49).
4) The narrator describes the layout of the classroom in S, with “twenty-six
desks screwed fast to the oiled floorboards” (33/50- 51). A sketch accompanies
this description. Paul’s bearing and teaching style are described. He often stood
not at the front, but “in one of the window bays towards the head of the room
half facing the class and half turned to look out, his face at a slightly upturned
angle with the sunlight glinting on his glasses; and from that position he would
talk across to us” (34/52). He spoke “in well-structured sentences”, “without
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any touch of dialect but with a slight impediment of speech or timbre, as if the
sound were coming not from the larynx but from somewhere near the heart”
(34- 35/52). Paul’s freethinking in religion and his “aversion to hjrpocrisy of any
descripdon” (“die Abneigung Pauls gegen aUes Scheinheilige”) are described
(36/55). He did not attend church. Instead of using the prescribed text, he
taught from a collecdon of stories, “the Rheinische Hausfreund’ (37/56) that he
“had procured, I suspect at his own expense” (37/56-57). He spoke fluent
French. He emphasized natural history, and he often took the class on visits to
interesting sites: a brewery, a gunsmith’s, a castle, and an abandoned coal mine.
He played the cladnet, and he was stdkingly good at whistling, favodng
melodies that the narrator only later recognized as by Brahms and Belhni
(41/61). He once brought to the class a young conservatory violinist, and Paul
was “far from being able to hide the emotion that [the] playing produced in him
[and] had to remove his glasses because his eyes had filled with tears” (41/62).
Often “he might stop or sit down somewhere, alone and apart from us all, as
if he, who was always in good spirits and seemed so cheerful, was in fact
desolation itself’ (“die Untrosthchkeit selber”) (42/62). — This teaching style,
and these and other incidents, are strikingly close to what we know of
Wittgenstein’s career as a rural schoolteacher, and Wittgenstein is mentioned
later in the text.
5) The narrator describes what he has learned about Paul from Lucy Landau,
who now lives in the ViUa Bonlieu in Yverdon, Switzerland and who had
arranged Paul’s burial in S. Since his retirement from teaching in 1971, Paul had
mostly lived in Yverdon. He and Lucy had met one another at Salin-les-Bains
in the French Jura, where she had been reading Nabokov’s autobiography on
a park bench (43/65). Some of Lucy’s own childhood in Switzerland is
recounted. Paul had explained to her in Sahn-les-Bains that his “condition” and
his “claustrophobia” had now made him unable to teach (43/65). His condition
included now seeing “his pupils, although he had always felt affection for them
(he stressed this), as contemptible and repulsive creatures (“verachtliche und
hassenswerte Kreaturen”), the very sight of whom had prompted an utterly
groundless violence in him on more than one occasion” (“sich habe ausbrechen
spiiren” — that he had felt break out in him (43-44/65-66). Paul, we are told
Lucy said, “was almost consumed by the loneliness within him (“von seiner
inneren Einsamkeit nahezu aufgefressenen”)”, though he was “the most
considerate and entertaining companion one could wish for” (44/66-67). In
conversation, Paul “had linked the bourgeois concept of Utopia and order---with the progressive destruction of natural life” (45/67). She herself, when
gazing with Paul at Lake Geneva from the top of Montrond, “had for the first
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time in her life----a sense of the contrarieties that are in our longings” (“die
widerspriichUchen Dimensionen unserer Sehnsucht”) (45/68). Lucy explains to
the narrator that Paul had earlier lived in France, from 1935 to 1939, and she
gives the narrator an album of photographs and notes, kept by Paul, that covers
“almost the whole of [his] life (45/68).
6) The narrator reports that “since then 1 have remrned to [the album] time
and time again, because, looking at the pictures in it, it tmly seemed to me, and
still does, as if the dead were coming back, or as if we were on the point of
joining them” (46/68- 69). Various photographs from the album are reproduced
in the narrator’s story that we are reading. The album and the photos tell of “a
happy childhood” (46/69) and years “in a country boarding school” (46/69).
Paul had submitted to the narrow-minded and morbidly Catholic demands of
a teacher training school, solely in order to be able to teach children (4647/69). In the summer following a year of probationary teaching in S in 193435, Paul spent a good deal of time with Helen HoUaender from Vienna, “an
independent-spirited, clever woman” whose “waters ran deep” and in which
“Paul Uked to see his own reflection” (48/72), at least as Mme. Landau
interprets the photographs to the narrator. In aummn 1935, Paul took up a
teaching post “in the remote village of W”, but was almost immediately
dismissed “because of the new laws” (48/72). Meanwhile Helen had returned
with her mother to Vienna, from where “there could be little doubt that Helen
and her mother had been deported, in one of those special trains that left
Vienna at dawn, probably to Theresienstadt in the first instance” (40-50/73).
7) Paul too, Mme. Landau reports to the narrator, is one-quarter Jewish, the
grandson of the Jewish merchant Amschel Bereyter from Gunzenhausen in
Franconia, and the son of Theodor, who had trained in a department store in
Nuremberg before opening his own shop in S (50- 51/75). “In his childhood”,
Mme. Landau reports Paul to have said,
everything in the emporium seemed far too high up for him, doubtless because he
himself was small, but also because the shelves reached all the four metres up to the
ceiling. The light in the emporium, coming through the small transom windows let
into the tops of the display window backboards, was dim even on the brightest of
days, and it must have seemed all the murkier to him as a child, Paul had said, as he
moved on his tricycle, mostly on the lowest level, through the ravines between
tables, boxes and counters, amidst a variety of smells - mothballs and lily-of-thevalley soap were always the most pungent, while felted wool and loden cloth assailed
the nose only in wet weather, herrings and linseed oil in hot (51/76).
Paul’s father Theo died of a heart attack on Palm Sunday, 1936, but perhaps
also from “the fury and fear that had been consuming him, ever since, precisely
two years before his death, the Jewish families, resident in his home town of
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Gunzenhausen for generations, had been the target of violent attacks” (53/79).
Even though it “could not be ‘Aryanized’ ” officially, the shop had nevertheless
to be sold for “next to nothing”, and Paul’s mother Thela “died within a few
weeks” (53-54/79-80).
8) After it became “no longer tenable” (55/81) for him as a German to serve
as a tutor in France, Paul returned to Berhn in 1939 to work at an office job in
a garage. A few months later he was called up, and he spent six years in the
motorized artillery, serving on all three fronts. Under one photograph of himself
from this period, Paul wrote that “day by day, hour by hour, with every beat of
the pulse, one lost more and more of one’s qualities, became less comprehen
sible to oneself, increasingly abstract” (56/83). In 1945, “a German to the
marrow” (“von Grund auf’) (57/84), Paul returned to S, “which in fact he
loathed, — said Mme. Landau” (57/84), again to teach. He “spent a lot of time
gardening” (57/85). During this time, he read “Altenberg, Trakl, Wittgenstein,
Friedell, Hasenclever, Toller, Tucholsky, Klaus Mann, Ossietzky, Benjamin,
Koestler, and Zweig: almost all of them writers who had taken their own hves
or been close to doing so” (58/86). He “copied out hundreds of pages” into his
notebooks, “time and again---- stories of suicides” (58/86), as though to
convince himself “that he belonged to the exiles and not to the people of S”
(59/87- 88). He retired in 1971 and thereafter lived principally in Yverdon, near
Mme. Landau, where he devoted himself to his gardening and reading.
9) In 1982, Paul’s vision once again began to deteriorate. In autumn 1983,
he informed Lucy that he wished to give up his flat in S. “Not long after
Christmas (60/89)”, they traveled to S together to settle affairs. “No snow had
fallen, there was no sign anywhere of any winter tourism.----On the third day
a spell of mild fdhn weather set in, quite unusual for the time of year. The pine
forests were black on the mountainsides, the windows gleamed Uke lead, and the
sky was so low and dark one expected ink to mn out of it any moment (6061 / 89-90). While Mme. Landau was sleeping in the afternoon from a headache,
Paul went out. Upon being informed of his death, she thought of the railway
timetables and directories he had coOected and of “the Marldin model railway
he had laid” (61/91) out in his rooms. Hearing this, the narrator thinks of “the
stations, tracks, goods depots and signal boxes” that he had had as a child to
copy from the blackboard in Paul’s classroom (61/91). Paul had told Mme.
Landau of a summer holiday in his own childhood that he had spent watching
trains pass “from the mainland to the island and from the island to the
mainland” (62/92). At that time, Paul’s uncle had said he would “end up on the
railways” (“bei der Eisenbahn enden”) (63/92). Though this struck her as
“darkly foreboding” (“er hatte auf mich die dunkle Wirkung eines Orakel-
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spruchs”) (63/93), Mme. Landau reported that “The disquiet I experienced
lasted only a very short time, and passed over me hke the shadow of a bird in
flight” (“ging iiber mich hinweg wie der Schatten eines Vogels tm Plug”)
(63/93).

4.
The action of this story, hke the action of lyric, takes place entirely in memory,
within the consciousness of the narrator and in the past tense. Also Hke lyric, the
overall stmctural pattern of the story is out-in-out. That is, an initiating scene
or incident in the world (here the news of Paul Bereyter’ suicide and the
subsequent newspaper account of it) prompts a course of memory, reflection,
and further action, all of which are then recollected in the past tense of the
narrative itself. The narrative then ends with a turn again out toward the world
— the image of Mme. Landau reporting the passing over her of her disquiet — so
as to let the world go its own way.
The recollective actions and attentions of the narrator model for us our
attentions to details of our own Hves, as we too seem sometimes to haunt the
world, from within our reserves of lonehness, yet also sometimes to be bound
up in things, without any clear sense of the forces or logic of lonehness and
activity. As in lyric, we participate in the narrator’s own recoUecdons and
attendons. In the case of the sixteen photographs and diagrams that appear
within the story, we hteraUy see what the narrator sees. Similarly, the narrator
himself, and we through the narrator, sometimes seem to see and feel what Paul
or Lucy see and feel, especiaUy, for example, in the long descripdon of the
details of Theo Bereyter’s emporium, with its high windows, dim hght, and
pungent smeUs. It is easy for us here to recall the fuguehke acdons of play
(riding a tricycle down the aisles) and seemingly giant scale of objects of our
own childhoods.
A philosophical or theological theory might hope to describe the essence of
the situadon that we share, to some extent, with Paul, Lucy, and the narrator.
A pohdcal or sexual history might hope to sort out and explain the reladve
influences on Paul, and on us, of Jewishness (or another rehgion) or of sexual
longing of one or another shape, subsuming Paul and us under its generahzations. Such descripdons and generahzadons might be apt. But something
nonetheless would be missed in them: the intimate detail and density of
consciousness and its movements in percepdon, as it finds itself now in this
situation, now in that, stmck by surprises and intensides that seem to resist fuh
capture by either essential descriptions or subsumpdve generahzadons. A task
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of literature — or at least of this kind of intensely lyrical and elegiac literature —
is to render some of these movements for our identification, thus enabling us,
along with their narrators (and writers) to work them through, so as to be all at
once ourselves, in our particular personalities, lonelinesses, and intensities of
perception and recollection, and also in the world, able, in the end, to let its go
its own way, with an appropriate sense of mystery and wonder at it, and at how
one has been in it, but not, quite, ever altogether of it. The movement of
working-through is as important or more important than the events that are
narrated. Sebald’s literary technique heightens our awareness of this through his
continual use of devices of interruption: narratively through shifts from the
narrator’s own investigations, to what Mme. Landau said, to what is actually in
Paul’s album; syntactically through the interjecdon of prepositional and
appositional phrases, piling up details for perception, in between noun phrase
subjects and verbs. These details invite reflections, both historical and philo
sophical; were there no such invitations, we would encounter only the incidental
or episodic. But reflection is not allowed to settle into any definite metaphysical,
sociohistorical, or psychoanalytic systems for interpretation. (One must, as
Schlegel remarked, both abandon oneself to the poetry of the text and hover
above it, seeking the universal.) This kind of literature presents for our working
through what this story has itself called “a sense of the contrarieties that are in
our longings” (“die widerspriichlichen Dimensionen unserer Sehnsucht”)
(45/68), as we ourselves move through its details and in doing so reflect on
them.
The story “Paul Bereyter” is in fact headed by a motto, “Manche Nebelflecken Idset kein Auge auf’, well enough translated as “There is mist that no
eye can dispel” (25/39). In fact, however, this motto is a quotation from a quite
special context: Jean Paul’s Vorschule derAsthetik, Part I, Section 3, Paragraph 14,
entitled “Instinct of Genius or the Matter of Genius” (“Instinkt des Genies oder
genialer Stoff’). The full passage runs as follows:
Many godlike spirits have been been impressed by destiny with a grotesque
(“unformkche”) form, as Socrates had the body of a satyr; for time governs the
form, but not the inner matter. Thus the poetic mirror with which Jakob Bohme
rendered heaven and earth hung in a dark place; also in some places the glass lacks
the foil. In this way the great Hamann is a deep heaven full of telescopic stars, and
some nebula spots (“Nebelflecken”) no eye can penetrate.’^

The immediate sense here is that Hamann’s deep writings, writings that capture
as it were the whole world, and Hamann the man himself, have features that no
one can understand. Discursive thought, seeking essential descriptions and
subsumptive generalizations, will miss at least something of what they contain
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and present. These somethings can at best be looked on from a certain distance
and with a certain awareness of one’s own incomprehension. In the phrase “in
a dark place” (“in einem dunklen Orte”), there is a further distant echo of
Dante’s “in a dark wood” in the opening hnes of the Inferno:
Midway through this way of life we’re bound upon,
I woke to find myself in a dark wood,
Where the right road was wholly lost and gone.''*

We lead our lives in time and as finite subjects, where the relations between the
form (that is, the social shape) of a life and the internal matter (that is, one’s
particular personality, feeling, and longing) remain, always, to some extent, other
than transparent. This lack of transparency shows itself especially in certain
initiating scenes and incidents and in the emotionally modulating reflections that
follow them, as one seeks more transparency, a better fit, or fuller attention,
until life is allowed to go on, on its own. Literature — some Uterature; this lyric
Uterature of Sebald’s - knows this and makes it manifest for us. To see and feel
this, and to see and feel it in detail, through perception and accompanying
reflection, is to be, in a certain way, deep.
Swarthmore College

Notes
' Eldridge (2003), p. 259 and passim.
■ Ibid., p. 260.
' Huemer (2004), p. 5.
* Ibid., pp. 6-7.
^ See Spinoza, Benedict de, E/fcPart V, Propositions III-X, pp. 369-377. Compare
also both R. G. ColUngwood on artistic expression (ColUngwood 1938), pp. 282-283
and WilUam Wordsworth (1965), p. 448, on how a poet may uncover “what is really
important to men” through thinking “long and deeply” in relation to our feeUngs.
Rothman and Keane (2000), p. 19.
' A wonderful essay on these parallel identifications is Ted Cohen’s “Identifying with
Metaphor: Metaphors of Personal Identification” (1999), pp. 399-409 on identifying
with Lily Bart, Jake Gittis, and Marlow, as well as Shakespeare, Mozart, and Conrad.
* Benjamin (1996), pp. 116-200. All references to this work will be given by page
number in the text.
’ Alert readers will already have recognized that the phrase “material figuration” in my
title is a paraphrase of the German “Darstellung” or material presentation. In the
opening Unes of his The Origin of German Tragic Drama, Benjamin remarks that “It is
characteristic of philosophical writing that at every turn it must confront the question
of representation [Darstellung] anew”. On the significance of this remark, see Seyhan
(1992) and Heifer (1996).
Marcuse (1978), p. 59.
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" See also the slightly different translation in Friedrich Schlegel, “On Goethe’s
Meisted’, trans. Joyce Crick, 2003, p. 273.
W. G. Sebald, “Paul Bereyter”, in The Emigrants, 2002, pp. 25-63; W. G. Sebald,
“Paul Bereyter”, in Die Ausgewanderten: VierlangeEr^dhlungen, 1994, pp. 39-93. Citations

to these works will be given in the text by English page number followed by German
page number, e.g. (25/39).
“Manchem gottiiche Gemiite wird vom Schicksal eine unformliche Form aufgedrungen, wie dem Sokrates der Satyr-Leib; denn iiber die Form, nicht iiber den innern
Stoff regiert die Zeit. So hing der poetische Spiegel, womit Jakob Bohme Himmel und
Erde wiedergibt, in einem dunklen Orte; auch mangelt dem Glase an einigen Stellen die
Folie. So ist der groBe Hamann ein tiefer Himmel voll teleskopischer Sterne, und
manche Nebelflecken loset kein Auge auf.” Jean Paul, 1836-7; English translation in
Jean Paul Richter, Horn ofOberon (1973), pp. 41-42.
Dante, The Divine Comedy I: H«//,Canto 1,11. 1 - 3, p. 71.
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